> Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 11:47:49 +0200 (CEST) > > > Le Monde diplomatique > > ----------------------------------------------------- > > September 2002 > > AFGHANISTAN'S SECRET GRAVES > > A drive to death in the desert > _______________________________________________________ > > President Bush wants to attack Iraq as part of his war on > terror and the "axis of evil", and would like the United > States to regulate world order, or disorder, alone. A new > empire is asserting itself on the international stage, > though not without debate inside the US. Meanwhile > Washington has been unable to bring stability to Afghanistan > nearly a year after its intervention. > > by JAMIE DORAN * > _______________________________________________________ > > THE bones are bleached white now, as though they had lain > here for centuries. But these human remains are only > months old; the last proof of the existence of young men > who had expected the protection of the Geneva conventions > and, instead died horribly, either from suffocation or by > summary execution. > > Close up, the gnaw marks of the incisors of canine nomads > roaming the desert by night are easy to pick out. Jaw > bones, ribs, fibulae and broken skulls are scattered > around the top of an unnatural mound in the sand perhaps > 50 metres long. Beside them, torn into many pieces, are > clothes dried to parchment. A closer inspection reveals > labels from Karachi, Lahore and elsewhere. > > Dasht Leili, Afghanistan, is the final resting place of > up to 3,000 men, some of whom died of suffocation on a > hellish journey, and others, their brother-prisoners, > were shot after pleading for mercy. They had come to this > godforsaken land to fight the infidels whom, they > believed, were the enemies of their God: they were > religious fanatics willing to give their own lives to > defend their faith. > > None would have believed, before they set off on their > pilgrimages from Pakistan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, > Tajikistan and from Arab states, that it would end this > way. > > Afghanistan is a key to the pan-Islamic dream. Under the > Taliban, this country, which has been devastated by > decades of war (both with outsiders and within), was a > kind of Mecca for those who kept the absolute word of the > Koran. The world had seen the Taliban's peculiar > interpretation of God's word in such things as the > smuggled-out pictures of women, shrouded in the > compulsory burkha, being executed at the football stadium > in Kabul for crimes that, in the West, would lead to > little or no penalty. The world also knew that > Afghanistan was one of the biggest producers of heroin. > > This was what had drawn me to the region. In April 2001 I > stood on the shores of the Amu Darya River separating > Uzbekistan from Afghanistan. I was investigating a new > drug smuggling route through the Central Asian countries. > No more than 200 metres from me, Taliban border guards > ambled around the dilapidated concrete structures of > Heiraton port, which had once served as a crucial exit > for thousands of tonnes of Soviet military hardware and > tens of thousands of soldiers. > > Straddling the river to the east was the unfortunately > named Friendship Bridge, its centre sealed by giant > blocks of stone. Several months later, I was taken across > this bridge secretly just before dawn and discovered that > there was a small gap between the blocks and the > side-railing. My Uzbek guardians directed me to go > through the gap, where I was met by soldiers of the > Northern Alliance who had succeeded in capturing not only > Heiraton, but the strategically crucial city of > Mazar-i-Sharif just 50 minutes' drive from the riverbank. > > The battle for Mazar was the most decisive of the Afghan > war and its key figure was General Abdul Rashid Dostum, > who is a brilliant military strategist and the most > feared of the warlords. Dostum had, very medievally, sent > 1,000 horsemen racing uphill through the mountains west > of Mazar to attack Taliban heavy artillery positions. > "They didn't expect that," said Dostum. "Had I sent men > on foot, they would all have been killed by the shelling. > With horses, we were able to get inside the range of > their heavy guns quickly and the Talibs ran away." Over > 300 horsemen died in the charge but, despite these hefty > losses, the charge began the Taliban collapse. > > At the height of the fighting, as Dostum battled on the > outskirts of the city of Mazar, Al Jazeera television > announced that he had been killed. The news came through > as I was talking to his right-hand man, Commander Mammoor > Hassan, on the frontline at the Kokcha River, tributary > to the Amu Darya. Panic gripped everyone around us: if it > was true, it would be the greatest setback for the > Northern Alliance since the assassination of Ahmad Shah > Massood. But Hassan was calm, with an absolute belief in > the near-immortality of his friend and > commander-in-chief. He asked to borrow my satellite phone > to call the general, and told him: "Abdul Rashid, they're > saying you're dead. On Al Jazeera, they said you had been > killed." > > Dostum, laughing, told him: "I don't think so: maybe I > should check. You shouldn't listen to this nonsense." > Hassan asked: "How is the battle going?" and Dostum > answered: "We need more ammunition, I'm having to buy > bullets from anyone who will sell them to me. But it's > going well and I've got 20 Americans with me; they're > very professional." > > United States planes had attacked enemy forward positions > in the fight for Mazar, but that remark was the first > confirmation in the war that US military personnel were > at the core of the battle against the Taliban. > > Two weeks before this, Hassan had told me privately that, > within eight hours of Dostum capturing Mazar, the full > Northern Alliance advance would begin. This happened, but > the size of the Taliban collapse was entirely unforeseen. > Kabul fell easily: from Kokcha in the northeast, from > Taloqan and from Mazar, the Taliban fled south to the > city of Kunduz. Up to 15,000 fighters, including several > thousand of the Taliban's foreign supporters, were > trapped in Kunduz as twice that number of Northern > Alliance soldiers besieged its boundaries. Some escaped > through a narrow corridor to the south and others agreed > to switch sides (this is a common feature of Afghan > warfare) to save themselves. For the rest, their fate lay > in the hands of negotiators. > > Like brothers > > Central to this was a local warlord, Amir Jhan, who > enjoyed mutual trust. "All the local commanders in Kunduz > were like my brothers and my friends. We had fought > together in previous years and they asked me to liase > with the Northern Alliance to finalise the matter through > negotiation rather than fighting. Some of the commanders, > including Marza Nasri, Agi Omer and Arbab Hasham > persuaded the al-Qaida and foreign groups to go along > with us," he said. > > The first offer to the Northern Alliance was that the > Taliban commanders were prepared to lay down their > weapons to the United Nations or a multi-national force > in return for guarantees. "I was present when the Taliban > mullahs Faisal and Nori came with other people to an > arranged meeting at Kalai Janghi with Generals Dostum, > Maqaq and Atta. Some Americans were there, and a few > Englishmen. A decision was taken that the Afghans at > Kunduz would give up their weapons and be allowed to > return to their homes while the al-Qaida and foreign > fighters would surrender and be handed over to the UN." > > Kalai Janghi, a large fortress on the outskirts of Mazar > which the Taliban and, subsequently, Dostum used as > headquarters, was to be central to events but, even as a > deal was being considered, the US Defence Secretary, > Donald Rumsfeld, intervened, concerned that any > negotiation to end the siege might eventually allow > foreign Taliban to go free: "It would be most unfortunate > if the foreigners in Afghanistan, the al-Qaida and the > Chechens and others who have been there working with the > Taliban, if those folks were set free and in any way > allowed to go to another country and cause the same kind > of terrorist acts." In the days after, he was widely > quoted as saying: "My hope is that they will either be > killed or taken prisoner. They're people who have done > terrible things." Northern Alliance commanders could not > afford to ignore the words of their most important ally > and paymaster, and they were not inclined to disagree. > Revenge, intiqaam, is almost a national sport in > Afghanistan and a bloody atmosphere engulfed the city of > Kunduz. A massacre seemed imminent. > > The sense of urgency was not lost on Amir Jhan, who raced > between the opposing sides in an attempt to halt the > inevitable. Finally, on November 21, they reached a > settlement: the entire Taliban force would surrender to > the Northern Alliance in return for a pledge that their > lives would be spared. Around 470 men (including many > suspected al-Qaida) were taken to Kalai Janghi where they > were incarcerated in tunnels below one of its giant > compounds. > > On 25 November two CIA operatives arrived to interrogate > individuals. During this time, there was a breakout as > the vanquished Taliban overpowered several guards, seized > their weapons and began shooting. Within minutes, the > CIA's Johnny "Mike" Spann was dead, along with 30 > Northern Alliance soldiers. > > A fire-fight began, magnifying when the Taliban captured > the fort's armoury, stupidly situated inside the compound > in which they were imprisoned. US Special Forces on the > ground called in air strikes, while the British SAS led > counter-attacks. By the third day of fighting, there was > not a single Taliban alive above ground at the fort, > which is very unusual in a military operation - one > always expects to find a few living combatants, albeit > badly wounded. > > The Western media, present in hundreds at the Kunduz > surrender, moved en masse to Kalai Janghi where they > filed exciting reports from the relative safety of the > adjacent compound and even further away. Kalai Janghi > became the centre of focus on the Afghan war, and the > discovery some days later of the American Taliban, John > Walker Lindh, and 85 others who had survived in the > tunnels below the fort strengthened its central position. > Incredibly, no one was concerned to ask at the time what > happened to the others who surrendered at Kunduz. > > The fate of those thousands of young men has led to calls > for independent, international inquiries after we > previewed our film at the European parliament in > Strasbourg. Their fate darkly stains the hands of > Northern Alliance soldiers, the Western media, the UN, > the US government and its military personnel. > > What happened to them involves another fort, previously > unmentioned by the media, where murder began and led to > the death of up to 3,000 prisoners. Amir Jhan, who helped > negotiate the surrender, said: "I counted them one by > one; there were 8,000. Now there are only 3,015 left. And > among these 3,015 are local Pashtun people from Kunduz, > Shiberghan, Balkh and Mazar, who were not even among the > original prisoners I handed over. Where are the rest?" > The answer lies partly in that 50-metre mound of sand in > the desert at Dasht Leili. > > Over 5,000 are missing. A few may have escaped; others > may have bought their freedom while more may have been > sold to the security agencies of their countries, to > return to a terrible fate. But according to a number of > eyewitnesses found during a six-month investigation, most > lie in the sand. None of our witnesses received payment > and all put themselves in great danger because they took > part in our film. > > The story begins at the fort of Kalai Zeini, which is on > the road from Mazar to Shiberghan. This fort, enormous > even by Afghan standards, was used as a holding point for > the thousands captured at Kunduz. The official objective > was to transfer them to Shiberghan prison where they > could be held before interrogation by American experts. > Those singled out would then be transferred to the base > at Guantanamo in Cuba. > > Containers of death > > At Kalai Zeini they were forced to sit, side by side, > across a vast field within the perimeters. Soon a convoy > of trucks arrived with metal cargo containers fastened to > their chassis. The prisoners were then ordered to line up > before being squeezed into these containers. A Northern > Alliance officer, who agreed to speak anonymously, said: > "We were responsible for delivering the prisoners and we > loaded 25 containers from Zeini to Shiberghan. We put > around 200 people into each container." > > Compressed into these airless, dark metal boxes in very > high temperatures, the Taliban cried for mercy. Another > Afghan soldier who lent credence to his testimony by > admitting he killed some prisoners, said: "I hit the > containers with bullets to make holes for ventilation and > some of them were killed." I asked him if he personally > shot holes into the containers, and why, and who gave the > orders, and he said: "The commanders ordered us." > > But his honesty conceals enormous cruelty. We found many > of the bullet holes in the containers were in the bottom > and middle, rather than at the top. If they had really > been intended for ventilation, then bullets fired into > the top of the containers would have given the prisoners > a better chance of survival. > > A taxi driver we met had called in at one of the > makeshift gas stations that litter the main roads: "At > the time they took prisoners from Kalai Zeini to > Shiberghan, I went to fill my car with petrol. I smelt > something strange and asked the attendant where it was > coming from. He said 'Look behind you'. There were three > trucks with containers on them. Blood was pouring from > the containers. It was horrible. I wanted to move but > couldn't because one of the trucks had broken down and > they had to tow it away, blocking my path." > > The following day he stood outside his home in Shiberghan > and another horrific sight caught his eye: "I saw another > three trucks loaded with containers drive past my house. > Blood was pouring from them." Some of the misery within > the sealed containers had not been relieved by the at > least fast death from bullets. The prisoners were left > for four or five days to die of suffocation, hunger and > thirst. When the containers were finally opened, a mess > of urine, blood, faeces, vomit and rotting flesh was all > that remained. The immediate question anyone who has seen > Shiberghan prison asks is how such an institution, > capable of holding no more than 500 prisoners, could > realistically have been expected to cater for 15 times > that number? Was it coincidence that many destined for > there never arrived? > > As the containers were lined up outside the prison, a > soldier accompanying the convoy was present when the > prison commanders received orders to dispose of the > evidence quickly: "Most of the containers had bullet > holes. In each container maybe 150-160 had been killed. > Some were still breathing, but most were dead. The > Americans told the Shiberghan people to get them outside > the city before they were filmed by satellite." This > accusation about US involvement will be crucial to any > inquiry: international, and national, civil and military > law relies on establishing the chain of command under > which crimes took place. It is a matter of determining > who was running the show at Shiberghan. > > We found two drivers from different regions who, on > separate days, led us to the same spot in the desert. > They were both visibly distressed. Their accounts of the > journey from Kalai Zeini through Shiberghan to Dasht > Leili are harrowing. > > Driver number one said: "There were about 25 containers. > The conditions were very bad because the prisoners > couldn't breathe, so they shot into the containers. Many > of the prisoners lost their lives. At Shiberghan, they > offloaded the prisoners who were obviously alive. But > there were some injured Taliban and others who were so > weak they were unconscious. We brought them to this > place, which is called Dasht Leili, and they were shot. I > came here three times and each time I brought about 150 > prisoners. They shouted and cried when they were shot. > There were about 10 or 15 other drivers who made the same > journey." > > Driver number two said: "They commandeered my truck from > Mazar without paying any money. They took my truck and > loaded a container on to it and I carried prisoners from > Kalai Zeini to Shiberghan and, after that, to Dasht Leili > where they were shot by the soldiers. Some of them were > alive, injured or unconscious. They brought them here, > bound their hands and shot them. I made four trips > backwards and forwards with prisoners. I brought 550-600 > people here." > > Despite many sightings by local villagers, drivers and > Northern Alliance soldiers, the Pentagon continues to > deny that American soldiers were present at the time in > Shiberghan or Dasht Leili. "They weren't in the vicinity > at all," according to Colonel David Lapan of Central > Command. He said they had carried out an internal > investigation and were satisfied that no US soldiers had > been present or witnessed atrocities. All calls for a > formal inquiry have been rejected. > > Driver number one said: "There were Jumbish [Uzbek] > people and American soldiers at Shiberghan jail. I didn't > see any [Americans] here, but I saw them at the prison > and they may have been in the trucks." > > Driver number two, asked about the presence of US > soldiers, said: "Yes, they were with us." At Dasht Leili? > "Yes, here." How many? "Lots of them: maybe 30-40. They > came the first two times with us but I didn't see them on > the next two trips." Months later the bulldozer tracks > were still visible on the final stages of the trail to > Dasht Leili: the bodies were pushed into a hollow and > then hidden under tons of sand. > > Even for those who survived the journey from Kalai Zeini > to Shiberghan prison, their fate at the hands of American > soldiers was hardly more merciful than death in the > desert, according to eyewitnesses. One soldier recounted > an incident when a US soldier murdered a Taliban prisoner > in order to frighten the others into talking: "When I was > a soldier at Shiberghan, I saw an American soldier > breaking a prisoner's neck. Another time, they poured > acid or something on them. The Americans did whatever > they wanted; we had no power to stop them. Everything was > under the control of the American commander." > > A general in the Northern Alliance, also stationed at > Shiberghan at the time, claimed: "I was a witness. I saw > them [US soldiers] stab their legs, cut their tongues, > cut their hair and cut their beards. Sometimes it looked > as if they were doing it for pleasure. They would take a > prisoner outside, beat him up and return him to the jail. > But sometimes they were never returned and they > disappeared, the prisoner disappeared." > > All of the witnesses in our film have agreed to attend > any international inquiry or court case that may result > from their statements. If given the opportunity, they > would be willing to identify the US personnel. While the > accusations of torture and murder in Shiberghan prison > may be difficult to substantiate so long after the event, > a mass grave containing the bodies of thousands of > prisoners does lie just four kilometres from that jail. > If US servicemen were involved in disposing of these > prisoners, if they headed the chain of command as alleged > by many witnesses, and stood by as hundreds were > summarily executed, then they are guilty of war crimes. > > While the US Congress rushes through laws to prevent any > American soldier from facing prosecution abroad, the > senators and representatives might wish to consider the > words of Andrew McEntee, a leading human rights lawyer > and former chairman of Amnesty International, who has > read the full transcripts of our witness statements and > viewed hours of filmed evidence. "I believe it is quite > clear from the evidence presented that an independent > inquiry is essential. These are not simply crimes against > international law, they are offences under the laws of > European countries, attracting universal jurisdiction. > And they are also offences under US law." > > If the US wishes to continue and even expand its role as > the world's policeman, standing firm against terror, it > must be seen to be applying the rule of law and not of > the gun. The 1968 massacre in the Vietnamese village of > My Lai, and the US army court martial of Lieutenant > William Calley, seem a long time ago, and the world may > have changed since, but the basic tenets of law and > justice remain the same. And the innocent have nothing to > fear from the truth. > ____________________________________________________ > > * International award-winning film producer and author, > formerly of BBC Television. In addition to documentaries > on Chile and Burma, he made 2001: The Making of a Myth > about Stanley Kubric. Massacre at Mazar will be released > worldwide in mid-October. > > See also The wedding bombing > > > > Original text in English > > > ____________________________________________________ > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ) 1997-2002 Le Monde diplomatique > >